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 Throughout The Divine Comedy, Dante employs the word “innocent” 
in a select few places, using the term specifically to refer to infant “innocents” 
who died soon after birth. Dante utilizes this label to explain his placement of 
these children within his spiritual hierarchy—in either Limbo or just below 
Paradise. What, then, does Dante mean by “innocent”? How does innocence 
affect how and where these souls are placed? Are these infants free from sin or 
guilt? It is unlikely that the latter question reflects Dante’s intention, as the 
doctrine of original sin is thoroughly woven throughout The Divine Comedy. 
Therefore, to address the meaning and the place of innocence in The Divine 
Comedy, this paper will examine Dante’s notion of original sin, his concept of 
true choice, the power of merit, and the role of ignorance in the structuring of 
his spiritual hierarchy.  
 The relationship between Dante’s use of the word “innocence” and his 
concept of original sin creates a unique discordance that hints at a deeper 
meaning. In Ante-Purgatory, Dante addresses the sinfulness of infants through 
Virgil, who states, “There I am with the infant innocents, those whom the teeth 
of death had seized before they were set free of human sinfulness” 
(Purgatorio. Canto VII. Lines 31-33). From this line, it is clear that, 
paradoxically, the infants’ souls are both innocent and within the grip of 
original sin. An additional contrasting idea is put forth in Hell, where Dante 
hears an explanation of Limbo’s inhabitants from Virgil: “They did not sin; 
and yet, though they have merits, that’s not enough, because they lacked 
baptism, the portal of the faith that you embrace” (Inf. IV. 34-36). The 
significance of baptism will be discussed in a subsequent paragraph, but the 
idea that those in Limbo (including the infants) did not sin does not agree with 
Dante’s numerous allusions to the original sin of Adam and Eve. For instance, 
Dante refers to human souls as the “evil seed of Adam” (Inf. III. 115), and the 
text later states, “[Dante] wears the weight of Adam’s flesh as dress, despite 
his ready will, is slow in his ascent” (Purg. XI. 43-45). How can the mutual 
existence of innocence and original sin be reconciled? 
 Dante places emphasis on the infants’ burden of original sin, yet he 
also writes that these infants, who have been placed in Limbo, have not 
sinned. In Dante’s view, then, while the infants did not sin of their own accord 
or choices, they still inherently carry the weight of Adam and Eve’s sins, 
which hinders them from ascending to Paradise. This is illustrated through 
Dante’s perspective on the relationship between sin and salvation: human 
souls, including these children, are naturally inclined towards God’s light. 
However, individuals who maintain sinful livelihoods drift away from God as 
their sinful behavior separates them from their Creator. Though the infants do 
not yet have knowledge of their sin or the means to act or choose (it is clear 
that they are placed in the spiritual hierarchy “for merits not their own”), they 
are still drawn toward Him, as “all are drawn and draw to God” (Par. XXVIII. 
129). Alternatively, or perhaps concurrently, it is also possible that the infants 
sinned simply by not knowing God. This idea is difficult to reconcile with the 
line that specifies “they did not sin,” but it also points to a different 
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 understanding of sin itself. Sin may not be entirely linked to the conscious 
choices or actions of individuals, but rather inherent in their being or 
existence—something they did not or could not choose—hence the concept of 
original sin. The infants did not sin through action by turning away from God, 
but they also did not turn toward him, and their inherent original sin places 
them further from God despite their innocence in terms of choice.  
The idea that infants do not have true choice is one possible 
explanation for their “innocence.” In the Divine Comedy, Dante places one 
group of infants just below Paradise, stating that they are there due to both the 
merits of others and the infants’ lack of true choice. Thus, the infants’ 
“innocence” might be a reference to their never having free choice to turn 
toward God or away from Him: “And know that there, below the transverse 
row that cuts across the two divisions, sit souls who are there for merits not 
their own, but—with certain conditions—others’ merits; for all of these are 
souls who left their bodies before they had the power of true choice” (Par. 
XXXII. 40-45). The infants were not yet able to choose for themselves or have 
their own merits, so their parents were left to decide for them in issues such as 
baptism and circumcision. These infants lack a power that others possess—
choice—and this factor sets them apart from other souls. Despite being born 
with original sin like the rest of humanity, these young souls never had the 
opportunity to address their innate sinfulness or commit their own voluntary 
sins. These infants were not able to make the decision to turn toward God, but 
neither did they choose a life of sin; they were therefore innocent of choice. 
This innocence of choice—in combination with their parents’ choices—results 
in their placement in either Limbo or just below Paradise.  
Saint Augustine, whose views influenced Dante’s work, presents a 
comparable viewpoint when he discusses infant selfishness in Confessions. 
Augustine seemingly denounces the idea of infant innocence, echoing the 
presence of original sin in infants by quoting Job 14:4-5: “[N]one is pure from 
sin before you, not even an infant of one day upon the earth” (9). Augustine 
furthers his argument about the sinful nature of infants, stating “the feebleness 
of infant limbs is innocent, not the infant’s mind” (9). He then illustrates this 
using an example of infant jealousy as two babies fight for their mother’s 
milk: “But it can hardly be innocence, when the source of milk is flowing 
richly and abundantly, not to endure a share going to one’s blood-brother, who 
is in profound need, dependent for life exclusively on that one food” 
(Augustine 9). This example supports the argument that infants are not 
innocent and are instead capable of selfishness—and therefore sinful. 
However, Augustine closes his discussion on infancy with a statement that 
skews the implication of these claims:  
If ‘I was conceived in iniquity and in sins my mother nourished me in 
her womb’ (Ps. 50:7), I ask you, my God, I ask, Lord, where and when 
your servant was innocent? But of that time I say nothing more. I feel 
no sense of responsibility now for a time of which I recall not a single 
trace. (10)  
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 Augustine struggled with the idea of innocence, especially since he did not 
feel responsible for his actions when he had no memory of these actions. This 
demonstrates that Augustine views the selfish actions of infants as some type 
of primal drive rather than a conscious choice of turning away from God. 
Augustine’s influence on Dante regarding this theology, then, is evident, as 
Dante alludes to Esau and Jacob, who fought in their mother’s womb before 
birth (an act demonstrating their capability for selfishness), concluding that, “it 
is just for the celestial light to grace their heads with a becoming crown” (Par. 
XXXII. 70-71). Despite their potentially sinful actions, they are still innocent 
and justly crowned. Dante’s comments on the topic of infants expand on the 
initial questions of Augustine, producing a similar yet unique perspective.  
 As aforementioned, the placement of infants in Dante’s hierarchy is 
heavily dependent on their parents’ choices for them—in other words, the 
merit of others. This reveals that the infants’ innocence is not enough to save 
them or determine their proximity to God, because they could not turn toward 
the God they did not know. In Paradiso, Dante writes, “without, then, any 
merit in their works, these infants are assigned to different ranks—proclivity 
the only difference” (XXXII. 73-75). The children themselves were unable to 
have any merit because they were unable to do any conscious works, so the 
burden falls to those who cared for them. This has a large impact on where 
they are placed in the spiritual hierarchy; their parents’ decisions predestined 
the children to either just below Paradise or in Limbo. The influence of 
parental choice is further explained when Dante elaborates on what constitutes 
merit on the parents’ part: 
In early centuries, their parents’ faith alone, and [the infants’] 
innocence, sufficed for the salvation of the children; when those early 
times had reached their completion, then each male child had to find, 
through circumcision, the power needed by his innocent member; but 
then the age of Grace arrived, and without perfect baptism in Christ, 
such innocence was kept below, in Limbo. (Par. XXXII. 76-84)  
This explanation demonstrates how important merit is in determining the fate 
of the infant’s soul, but it also shows how, though the definition of sufficient 
merit shifted over time, innocence of the infants remained constant 
throughout. Additionally, even those children placed farther away from 
Paradise in Limbo retain their innocence—it is simply “kept below.” Though 
merit is important in the hierarchy, it is not solely responsible, and innocence 
is independent of merit.  
 Furthermore, infant souls are not punished with pain or physical 
suffering as are others, even in Limbo. Virgil says that he is placed with the 
infants in a realm of a different form of suffering than shown in Inferno: 
There is a place below that only shadows—not torments—have 
assigned to sadness; their lament is not an outcry, but a sigh. There I 
am with the infant innocents, those whom the teeth of death had seized 
before they were set free of human sinfulness; there I am with those 
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 souls who were not clothed in the three holy virtues—but who knew 
and followed after all the other virtues. (Purg. VII. 28-36) 
This shows that the merit of their parents’ choices of baptism and circumcision 
held import in the eyes of God, but merit alone was not the only factor 
determining the infants’ eternal place in the hierarchy. Merit means the 
difference between Limbo and Paradiso, but the infants are still not punished 
as harshly as those judged for their own merit.  
 Tangential to the importance of merit’s relationship to innocence is the 
concept of ignorance, as seen in the other non-infant souls dwelling in Limbo. 
In Limbo live those worthy souls who were not baptized or lived before the 
time of Christ. They are placed here because they are virtuous in their own 
right (or in the infants’ case, virtuous by others’ merits), although they did not 
pursue their faith in God fully on their own accord. These souls were virtuous 
but did not know God and could therefore not turn toward Him because of 
this. Their placement in Limbo suggests that ignorance was taken into account 
in deciding their place; although ignorance weighs these souls down and pulls 
them farther from God, it does not damn them to the deepest and most 
punishing depths of Hell. Dante writes: 
They did not sin; and yet, though they have merits, that’s not enough, 
because they lacked baptism, the portal of the faith that you embrace. 
And if they lived before Christianity, they did not worship God in 
fitting ways … For these defects, and for no other evil, we now are lost 
and punished just with this: we have no hope and yet we live in 
longing. (Inf. IV. 34-42) 
Infants are held partially accountable for not knowing of God or baptism, in 
addition to their parents’ ignorance or ignorant choices. Those who lived 
before Christianity (Greek and Roman heroes and philosophers, including 
Aeneas, Hector, Virgil, Socrates and Plato) are similarly affected by their lack 
of knowledge of the one true God. In The Republic, Plato defines ignorance 
with the statement: “Knowledge, then, is of what is and ignorance necessarily 
is of what is not” (169). The philosophers and infants did not know God, 
making them ignorant, though due to no action or choice on their part. Plato’s 
work, which also influenced Dante’s worldview, interpreted ignorance as evil 
and unjust (48-49). In combination with Dante’s other ideas, the concept of 
ignorance as evil helps explain why it would cause those who otherwise lived 
virtuous lives to sink further from Paradise and from God, though his light still 
reaches them, as “the light of God so penetrates the universe according to the 
worth of every part, that no thing can impede it” (Par. XXXI. 22-24). The 
light of God and baptism bring the infants, philosophers, and heroes alike out 
of Hell. They are still separated from God, however, due to original sin and 
their ignorance of God, even if these souls are not completely responsible for 
this ignorance.  
 Notwithstanding the complex web of meanings of Dante’s idea of 
innocence, it is evident that the use of innocence as a placement tool is 
important to understanding Dante’s work as a whole. Dante’s definition of 
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 innocence and its role in the heavens is nuanced by its relation to original sin, 
choice, merit, and ignorance. Innocence, when examined through each of these 
lenses, can be seen to be made up of a lack of choice and, perhaps more 
importantly in Dante’s worldview, a lack of knowledge about God. Innocence 
in conjunction with merit and original sin, which is a simple fact of existence, 
determines how far the “infant innocents” are placed from God. Dante 
addresses any questions concerning the placement of the infants in the text 
itself: “Whatever you may see has been ordained by everlasting law, so that 
the fit of ring and finger here must be exact; and thus these souls who have, 
precociously, reached the true life do not, among themselves, find places high 
or low without some cause” (Par. XXXII. 55-60). This statement 
demonstrates that the placement of the infants in the hierarchy was entirely 
intentional, based on cause and ordained by everlasting law. It serves to 
highlight the significance of any placement factors, including innocence—a 
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